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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-PRESENCE

OF ALTERNATE JUROR IN JURY Room.

Defendant was found
-[California]
guilty of kidnapping, a felony under the California Law: Cal. Pen.
'Code (Deering, 1931) §209. This
appeal is from the judgment entered against him. At the trial, the
judge foresaw that the proceedings
might be protracted, and after the
regular jury had been sworn, he
swore in two persons as alternate
jurors, in accordance with the Alternate Juror Statute: Cal. Pen.
Code (Deering, 1931) §1089. At the
close of the trial, but before the jury
had retired to deliberate, in order to
detergiine the meaning of the 1933
amendment to the Code regarding
the custody of alternate jurors, it
was stipulated with the consent of
the *defendant that the two alternate
jurors be allowed to.accompany the
jury to the jury room so as to profit
by the discussions of the jury in the
event they should be needed later
as substitutes, but otherwise to take
no part in the deliberations.. Held:
on appeal, reversed. Presence in
jury room during deliberations of
jury in criminal case of alternate
jurors to whom the case had not
been submitted for decision is reversible error: People v. Bruneman,
(Cal. App., 1935) 40 Pac. (2d) 891.
Cal. Pen. Code (,Deering, 1931)
§1089, permitting alternate jurors,
was adopted in 1895, and allows the

trial court to have one or two alternates appointed, within his discretion when it appears to him that
the trial may be protracted. Such
alternates are afforded the same
opportunity to hear the proceedings
of the trial as the regular panel of
twelve. As the statute was originally, the alternate juror might be
substituted for any juror who became ill or died, or was forced to
withdraw from the jury for any
other valid reason before the case
was finally submitted to the jury.
If no need had arisen for th'- substitution of an alternate by the time
the case *as submitted to the jury,
the alternates were dismissed. In
1933, §1089 was amended. Alternate jurors were selected in the
same manner and under the same
circumstances as before, and were
also afforded the same opportunity
to hear the proceedings of the trial.
The change in the statute was that
they should not be discharged on
the final submission of the case to
the jury, but should be kept in the
custody of the sheriff until the final
discharge of the original jury, and
they should be available for substitution for any of the regular
jurors in case of need, either before
or after the final submission of the
case to the jury. The important
question here involved is whether
this amendment permits of the al-

[121]

122
ternates' being present in the jury
room during the deliberations.
Perhaps the most recent, and most
carefully drafted Criminal Code in
this country, is the one now being
considered in Illinois, which was
planned by a committee of the Illinois State Bar Association. It is
interesting to note that this proposed code contains a section permitting the selection of alternate
jurors if the judge thinks the trial
is apt to be protracted: §434 of the
proposed Illinois Criminal Code.
This provision is very much like
that in force in California prior to
its amendment, and calls for the
discharge of the alternates upon
the final submission of the case to
the jury, if they have not been
needed prior to that time. Similar
measures are being considered by
a large number of Bar Associations: e. g., 25 J. Crim. L. 466.
The California Constitution provides that the right to trial by jury
shall remain inviolate: Cal. Const.,
art. I, §7. In Peofie v. Powell
(1891) 87 Cal. 348, 25 Pac. 481,
this was construed as guaranteeing
the right as it existed at common
law. However, the qualifications of
the jurors may be fixed by statute:
Ex parte Mana (1918) 178 Cal. 213,
172 Pac. 986. In People v. Peete,
(1921) 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 Pac. 51,
it was decided that the appointment
by the court of alternate jurors,
and even the substitution of one
of these jurors, when done in the
manner provided by statute does
not impair the right to a trial by
jury as knqwn at common law, but
it was merely a reasonable regulation respecting the enjoyment of
such 'right. The basis for this decision was that at common law
there are three requisites to trial by
jury: that issues of fact be passed
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on by twelve persons; that these
persons be impartial; that their decision be unanimous. See Jennings
v. State (1908) 134 Wis. 307, 114
N. W. 492; Harrisv. People (1889)
128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563. Under
the Alternate Juror Statute, at all
times there were only twelve jurors
.considering issues of fact, and it
was intended as a mere procedural
change from the common law, where
the entire jury would have to be
discharged if any one juror became
unable to serve, by allowing substitutions to keep the jury at its
full number of twelve during the
entire trial. The recent amendment
to the act was not intended to alter
the numerical requirement of twelve
persons serving on a jury, but
went one step further in allowing a
substitution even after the deliberations of the jury had commenced.
In the instant case the California
Appellate Court decided that the
provision of the Statute calling for
the keeping of these alternates inthe custody of the sheriff was not
intended to allow the alternates to
be present during the deliberations
of the jury. The right of a jury
to deliberate in private has long
been a part of the common law,
dating at least to 1628: "Co. Litt."
§366. The principle still obtains in
England, having been recently applied in The King v. Wood, Ex
parte Anderson, [1928] 1 K. B. 302,
where it was held reversible error
for a coroner to go into the jury
room after the jury had retired to
consider their verdict. In Canadian
criminal cases, the rule has not been
so strictly applied, and the test has
been whether the presence or 'act
of the person whose presence in
the jury room was unauthorized,
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice: Rex v. Batterman (1915) 24
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Can. C. C. 351; Res v. Melurg,
(1921) 51 0. L. R. 229. There is
also some division of opinion in this
country, but all courts agree at least
that if the defendant could reasonably be prejudiced by the presence
of an outsider in the jury room,
the error is reversible: People v.
Knapp (1879) 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.
W. 927; Rickard v. State (1881)
74 Ind. 275. The same reasoning
has been applied to the deliberations
of the grand jury: State v. 'Bowman (1897) 90 Me. 363. The California court relies on the Knapp
.case, supra, dind the Rickard case,
supra, and concludes that since the
alternate juror is not one of the
jurors until he has actually been
substituted (People v. Peete, supra),
it was error to allow these strangers
to be present during the delibera-.
tions of the jury, an error so prejudicial that it can be assumed the
defendant was harmed thereby.
This result does not seem to be
based on sound reasoning. The fact
that the defendant consented to the
presence- of the alternates in the
jury room would indicate that he
did not consider their mere presence, in silence, prejudicial. In the
absence of a showing of some harmful result from their presence, other
courts have held that the presence
of a stranger in a jury room is not
reversible error. Doles v. State
(1884) 97 Ind. 555, an Indiana case
later than the Rickard case, supra,
relied on by the California court
holds that where the, presence of
a stranger in the jury room is not
prejudicial, the error, is not reversible. The court seems to disregard
its own decision of People v. Rowell
(1901) 133 Cal. 39, 65 Pac. 127,
holding that unless such misconduct
affects the impartiality of the -jury,
or disqualifies them from the proper
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performance of their duties, it is not
such misconduct as will affect their
verdict. See also Coats v. State

(1911)

101 Ark. 51, 141 S. W. 197.

It is to be noted that the present
decision does not declare the amendment to the California Statute unconstitutional, but merely says that
the procedure here used was not in
conformity with the intent of the
legislature in drafting this statute.
When this question arises, it is possible that the California court will
extend the doctrine of People v.
Peete, supra, by saying that so long
as the alternate juror is not allowed
in the jury room until he is needed,
it would then be proper to substitute
him for a regular juror in accordance with the amendment, for in
this way the jury would at all times
consist of twelve people. The advisability of sustaining this amendment is doubtful, for if the alternate juror were actually substituted
at any time after the final submission of the case to the jury, he
would be deprived of that part of
the deliberations of the jury that
had preceded his substitution, and
the questions there discussed might
not .recur after his substitution, perhaps to the defendant's prejudice.

E.

V. MOORF.

CONCLUANswER.
-[Illinois]
Three assistant state's
attorneys and an agent of the gov2
ernor vere ordered to show cause
why they should not be punished
for contempt of court. The petition
was based on the defendant's alleged-'participation in a consummated agreement to avoid a writ of
habeas corpus. Individual sworn
answers were filed by each defendant denying the charge. The judge
CRIMINALt CONTEMPT-

SIVENESS

OF DEFENDANT'S
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held them guilty of indirect criminal contempt and clearly indicated
that his decision was based on the
facts as stated in all the answers
considered collectively. Held: on
appeal, reversed. Each answer is
to be deemed conclusively to be
true, and if sufficient in itself to
, purge the contempt, its author is
entitled to a discharge regardless
of impeaching information otherwihe brought to 'the knowledge of
the judge: People v. Northup et al.
(1935) 279 111. App. 129.
It is undeniable that this principle
of purgation as stated by the appellate court has been the rule consistently applied to indirect criminal
contempts in law actions in this
state. - A complete statement is
found in People v. McLaughlin
(1929) 334 I1l. 354, 166 N. E. 67,
where the court speaking of -indirect criminal contempts proceedings
said, "In such cases the defendant
is tried uponiiis answer alone. No
other evidence may b.e heard. If
the party charged shows by his
answer under oath that he is not
guilty of the contempt charges, his
answer is conclusive. If the answer
is false, the remedy is by indictment for perjury. The answer'must
be taken as true, and if sufficient
to purge the party of the contempt
he is entitled to be discharged."
This rule, however is inapplicable
to civil contempts: O'Brien v. People (1905) 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. E. 108;
to equity proceedings: 'Storey v.
People (1875) 79 Ill. 45; to contempts based on special statutes
providing f6r a definite procedure
in trying violations thereof, People
v. Sylvester (1926) 242 Ill. App. 565.
The chain 6f justification suggested in the Illinois decisions is
threefold: 1) our statute adopts
the English common law, 1606. Il.
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Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1933) c. 28, §1.
2) The declaration in Welch v. People (1889) 30 Ill. App. 399, that
Blackstone is the conclusive authority in Illinois as to the common law
at that date. 3) The dictum based
_on Blackstone in Crook v. People
(1885) 16 III. 534, considered as a
.controlling statement of the application of the rule.
The historical basis for the rule
that in proceedings of indirect criminal contempts the defendant's answer is the exclusive and conclusive
evidence available to the court has
been discredited by Sir John C. Fox.
His -recent thorough investigation
of the actual English procedure demonstrates that contempts committed
by strangers out of court against
the dignity of the common law
courts were punished not summarily
but by information or indictment
until 1641: Fox, "The History of
Contempt of Court" '(1927).
It
was not until the abolition of the
Star Chamber that the court of the
King's Bench was given power by
Parliament to punish all contempts
summarily: 16 Car. 1, cc. 10, 11.
T"his authority, however, was not
exercised by the court as to indirect criminal contempts until 1721
in the case of King v. Barber (1721)
1 Strange 244; see also, Curtis and
Curtis, "The Story of a Notion in
the Law of Criminal Contempt"
(1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 51. Fortyfour years only elapsed between
this first exercise of the power and
C. J. Wilmot's statement in King
v. Almon that the practice in the
afore-mentioned case was "immemO6ial." (1765) Wilm. 243. A clear
and 'vigorous repudiation of this
treatment of the defendant's answer
came thirty-one years later in England when the court said that it
'was a better policy to allow the

.
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judge to hear whatever evidence
was available under the rules of a
full trial procedure: In the Matter
of Crossby (1796) 6 T. R. 701.
But the error of Wilmot was preserved for some American jurisdictions by Blackstone who, quoted
the former without investigation as
to his accuracy: 4 B1. Comm. *288
(1765).
The Appellate Court,
moreover, would seem to have been
in error in Welch v. People, supra,
when it stated that Blackstone was
the conclusive authority on the
common law as it existed in Eng.land in 1606. For in People v.
Bruner (1931) 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.
E. 400, the supreme court in -reach-.
- ing
its decision as to whether the
jury at common law in 1606 was
• the trier of the law as well as of
• the facts, searched the entire field
of legal literature for information.
Thus, since the historical basis no
longer exists, upon what other theory can the doctrine be upheld?
None has been suggested by decisions involving the question: O'Brien
v. Pdople (1905) 216 Ill. 354, 75
9. E. 108; Hake v. People (1907)
230 Ill. 174, 82 N. E. 561; People
v. Seymour (1916) 272 Ill. 295, 111
N. E. 1008; People v. McDonald
(1924) 314 Ill. 548, 145 N. E. 636;
People v. Rongetti (1931) 344 Ill.
107, 176 N. E. 292; People v. Whitlow (1934) 357 Ill. 34, 191 N. E. 222.
The objections to enforcing the
rule have been numerous. One of
the most serious is that the principle
of purgation in compelling the defendant to answer violates the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination. The courts have felt
themselves so bound by the traditional sanctioning of requiring the
defendants to answer regardless of
their objection, that they have been
forced to evade the question as a
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practical necessity; that is, if the
court could not require the defendant to answer, and if his answer was
the exclusive evidence upon which
the court determines the question of
guilt or innocence, there would be
no method of upholding the dignity
of the tribunal without nullifying
the rule: 0 Neil v. People (1904)
113 Ill. App. 195; People v. Seymour, supra; Kanter v. Clerk of
Circuit Court (1903) 108 Ill. App.
287. Unjustifiable distinctions have
been attempted as replies to the
charge of self-incrimination such as
distinguishing between contempt
proceedings which are criminal or
quasi-criminal in nature and those
which are of a remedial character,
and thus not within the privilege.
It has also been claimed that the
contempt proceeding is not a trial
and that therefore the defendant is
not answering in the capacity of a
witness so that his answers cannot
be considered as evidence. These
vague generalities have been scoffed
at by common sense judges who have
insisted upon the fair administration
of court proceedings by allowing the
judge to consider a large variety
of evidence and thus to protect the
defendant's privilege of silence: In
re Verdon (1916) 89 N. J. L. 16,
97 Atl. 783; see also, Justice Holmes'
statement in U. S. v. Shipp (1906)
203 U. S. 563, 27 S. Ct. 165,
. The expressions of dissatisfaction
with the rule made by the very
judges.who-have applied it in Illinois is a potent argument in favor
of the abolition of the rule: Welch
v. People, supra; O'Brien v. People,
supra, and the opinion in the instant case. This could be done by
the legislature with the added advantage of certainty: Welch v. People, supra (concurring opinion of
J. Moran). That body, however,
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has taken no action after the judicial suggestion was made in 1889
and now, that Sir John Fox has
clearly demonstrated that the basis
upon which the Illinois doctrine
rests is erroneous, the court should
exercise its power to put this jurisdiction among the enlightened group
'whose tribunals by their own initiative have eliminated this antiquated
practice: In re Matter of Crossby,
supra; U. S. v. Shipp, supra; Clark
v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) 61 Fed.
(2d) 695; Ex parte
Bankhead
(1917) 200 Ala. 102, 75 So. 478;
Pel v. Thompson (1932) 91 Colo.
566, 17 Pac. (2d) 538; Huntington
v. McMahon (1880) 48 Conn. 174;
Dobbs v. State (1875) 55 Ga. 272;
Ex pdrte Gould (1893) 99 Cal. 360,
33 I'ac. 1112; In re Nickell (1892)
27 Kans. 734, 28 Pac. 1076; Ramsay
v. Ramsay (1921) 125 Miss. 715, 88
So. 280; In re Haines (1902) 67
N. J. L. 442, 51 At1. 929; Crow v.
State (1859J 24 Tex. 12. This
would be the better policy of judicial administration in allowing the
judge to gain the benefit of all the
available evidence instead of being
hindered by -the "blinders" imposed
by the instant holding. The opportunities for bold perjury under
sanction of the present rule'wo-ald
disappear. The temptation now existing to those who know of the
technical restrictions on the judge's
power to act in indirect criminal
contempt proceedings, to take advantage of the opportunity given to
gain unethical ends (such as here
were obtained by the state's attorneys) woufd be abolished.
HORTENSE

KLEIN.

HOMICIDE COMMITTED IN PERPETRATION OF ARSON AS MURDERNECESSITY OF INTENT TO KILL.-

[Ohio]
Defendant set fire to a
store owned by him and others for
the purpose of obtaining the insurance thereon. Upper floors of the
building were used as apartmentsand were occupied at the time.
Several of the occupants died in
the ensuing fire. Defendant was
convicted of murder in the first degree. Held: on appeal, modified to
manslaughter. To constitute murder
in the first degree there must be a
specific intent to kill. Turk v. State
(Ohio, 1934) 194 N. E. 425.
At common law any homicide
resulting from the perpetration
or attempt to perpetrate "a felony was murder. Intent to kill was
an essential ingredient of murder,
but such intent could always be conclusively presumed where the homicide occurred during the commission
of a felonious act: Clark and Marshall "Crimes" (2d ed., 1895) §242;
State v. Glover (1932) 330 Mo. 709,
50 S. W. (2d) 1049, 87 A. L. R..
400; State v. Cooper (1833) 13 N.
J. L. 361, 25 Am. Dec. 490; Washington v. State (1930) 187 Ark.
1011, 28 S. W. (2d) 1055. A limitation on the above rule was expressed in Reg v. Serne (1887) 16
Cox C. C. 311, requiring that the
felony be one known to be dangerous to human life before the homicide could be murder. This restriction has been adopted in some jurisdictions: People v. Olesen (1889)
80 Cal. 127, 22 Pac. 125; Lamb v.
People (1880) 96 Ill. 73; State v.
Glover, supra. It has been said
that if the unlawful act were only
a misdemeanor and a homicide resulted, the crime would be murder
at common law, State v. Shelledy
(1859) 8 Iowa 477, but that doctrine
is usually restricted to cases where
the misdemeanor involves a breach
of the peace, Brennan v. People
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(1854) 15 Ill. 511, or where the unlawful acts are such as would endanger human life: U. S. v. Ross
(181.3) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16, 196;
State v. Jimmerson (1896) 118 N. C.
1173, 24 S. E. 494; State v. Finely
(1896) 118 N. C. 1161, 24 S. E. 495.
The great majority of states have
adopted the common law rule by
legislation, and no intent to kill
need be shown where the homicide
is the result of the perpetration of
a felony. Thus, death resulting
from the commission of the crime
of arson is murder: Riddick v.
Co.m. (1895) 17 Ky. 1020, 33 S. W.
416; State v. Meadows (1932) 330
Mo. 1020, 51 S. W. (2d) 1033. In
a recent Illinois case the defendant
set fire to. his store for the purpose
of collecting the insurance thereon.
The partition wall between defendant's store. and an. adjoining residence was burnt through and several occupants of the dwelling were
burned to death. The conviction of
defendant for murder under Ill. Rev.
Stat.# (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 38,
§363, was upheld: People v. Goldvarz (1931) 346 Ill. 398, 178 N. E.
892. Even in the absence of express
statutory provisions, the requirement
of an intent to kill has been satisfied by presuming that the defendant intended the natural and pr6bable consequences of his acts: People v. Chiaro (1911) 200 N. Y. 316,
93 N. E. 931; State v. Stitt(1908)
146 N." C. 643, 61 S. E. 566, 17 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 308; Turner V. State

(1912) 8 Okla. Cr. 11, 126 Pac.
452; People v. Bennett (1911) 161
Cal: 214, 118 Pac. 710. The policy
of the majority rule would seem to
be a healthy one. The ruthless perpetrators of criminal acts which, by
their very nature, tend to jeopardize
human life and safety should be
punished to the extent of the law.
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The Ohio court in the instant
case concluded that the statute requires a specific intent to kill before a homicide committed in the
perpetration of. arson can be murder. The statute reads: "Whoever
purposely, and eitter of deliberate
and premeditated malice, or by
means of poison, or in perpetrating
or attempting to perpetrate rape,
arson, robbery or burglary, kills
another, is guilty of murder in the
first degree." Code of Ohio (Throckman, 1934) c. 3, §12,400. While it
is true that a literal construction of
the statute would require that an
intent to kill exist in the mind of
the defendant at the time the homicide was committed, yet there is
nothing in the statute to prevent
the court from implying that intent
as in the majority of jurisdictions.
The Ohio court cites no authorities
and inspection of previous Ohio
cases reveals none. In fact there
are strong dicta in previous Ohio
cases in which the court has indicated that it viewed with approval
the doctrine of presumed intent applied by tt~e courts of all other jurisdictions: Jones v. State (1894) 51
Ohio St. 331, 38 N. E. 79; Conrad
v. State (1906) 75 Ohio St. 52, 78
N. E. 957. True, in Robbins v. State
(1857) 8 Ohio St. 151, homicide resuiting from administering poison
for purposes of producing an abortion was held not to be murder in
absence of an intent to kill, but this.
situation 'is' covered in Ohio by a
statute making death by abortion a
crime of lesser degree than murder:
Code of Ohio (Throckmorton, 1934)
c. 3, §12,412. Also, in Fouts v. State
(1857) 8 Ohio -St. 98, it was held
that where death resulted -from an
assault and battery an allegation of
intent to kill had to be made in the
indictment before a conviction could
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be had for murder, but it is to be hands and pushed him down-stairs
noted that ordinary assault and bat- into the arms of two police officers
tery is not a felony and the holding who had just entered the vestibule
in that case offers no authority for
of the building. The Public Dethe result of the instant case. Here, fender of Cook County contended
the' court infers that there might that the evidence showed not an
be a case in which' intent would be assault as charged in the indictment
presumed but declines to do so, stat- but an attempt to commit robbery
ing that the death was not the nat- ,and therefore punishable under §581
ural and probable consequence of of the Criminal Code by from one
the defendant's act. It is difficult to five years. Held: on appeal, afto conceive of a'case where the re- firmed. It is sufficient to support a
sulting death could be more prob- conviction of assault with intent to
able than one where a building rob that the victim is put in fear of
which is being used and occupied suffering a violent injury: People
is set afire. If the court will not v. Rockwood (1934) 358 Ill. 422,
indulge .in the presumption in such 193 N. E. 449.
a case it probably will never do so.
Since the crime is statutory, beIt is submitted that the decision fore we begin any discussion of the
is.based upon an unnecessarily problem, we must understand the
narrow construction of the Ohio legislative intent as expressed by the
statute and is difficult to justify on statutes themselves. "An assault is
principle or by precedent.
an unlawful attempt coupled with
W. J. STELLMAN.
the present ability to commit a violent injury upon the person of another." Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1933) c. 38, §55. "An assault with
ASSAULT WITR INTENT TO ROBPRESENT ABILITY.-[Illinois]
The intent to commif murder, rape, maydefendant was convicted of assault hem, robbery, larceny or other felwith intent to rob and sentenced to ony shall subject the offender to
the penitentiary for a period of imprisonment in the penitentiary for
from one to fourteen years as pro- a term of not less than one nor
Ill.
vided by Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith- more than fourteen years."
Hurd, 1933) c. 38, §58. The ac- Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c.
"Whoever attempts to
cused met one Hyman Washan on 38, §58.
stairs leading from the second to commit any offense prohibited by
the first floor of an apartment build- law, and does any act towards it but
ing in Chicago, thrust his right hand fails, or is intercepted or prevented
into the left side of the witness and in its execution, where no express
said, "Stick 'em up.' As the wit- provision is made by law for the
ness raised his hands the defendant punishment of such attempt, shall be
started to go through Washan's punished, when the offense thus atpockets with his left hand. Washan tempted is a felony, by imprisonmoved slightly at the start of these -ment in the penitentiary not less
operations and defendant's hands than one, nor more than five years."
slipped. The' victim looked down 'Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1933)
and saw, for the- first time, that c. 38, §581.
the defendant did not have a gun,
To convict for the offense of aswhereupon he seized the defendant's sault with intent to commit a fel-
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ony the elements of an assault must
clearly be proved as well as an intent to commit the felony: State v.
Greco (1918) 30 Del. 140, 104 Atl.
637 (assault with intent to rape);
Foss v. State (Ohio App. 1930) 173
N. E. 296 (assault: intent to rob).
The Illinois Court has rot been
consistent in interpreting the assault
with intent statute. People V. Connors (1912) 253 Ill. 266, 97 N. E.
643, did not require a specific intent
to commit a murder to convict of
assault with intent to murder (the
demand of the assailant was in the
-alternative).
Later, in People v.
Parker (1914) 264 Ill. 36, 105 N. E.
740, the court declared it was as.
essential in a charge of assault with
intent to murder to prove the intent
as it was 'to prove the assault, and
to prove it with the same certainty.In People v. Henry (1934) 356 Ill.
141, 190 N.- E. 361, no specific intent
was deemed necessary in a charge
of assault with intent to rob. However, in People v. Jenkins (1931)
342 Ili. 238, 174 N. E. 30, the court
insisted - upon a factual intent
coupled with the present means of
effecting this intent in a charge of
assault with intent to rape. It is to be
noted that this last offense has never
been interpreted as 'strictly as the
offense in the instant case: see
Franey v. People (1904) 210 Ill. 206,
71 N. E. 443. And to support an
indictment for an assault with intent to .commit mayhem it must appear that the means employed were
adequate and the assailant intended
to employ these means for the purPose of mayhem: Dahlberg v. People (1907) 225 Ill. 485, 80 N, E. 310.
It is conceded by the Public Defender that the defendant had the
intent to rob, but the question is
whether he had the intent to commit a-violent injury on the victim,
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an intent which is manifested by
proving a present ability in the defendant to commit the violent injury. Does a man's finger constitute such present ability as is capable of inflicting a violent injury
upon the person of another? This
is the question upon which the case
turns. In the instant case and People v. Henry, supra, the court has
adhered to the practice of judicial
legislation and altered the statute
written by the Illinois Legislature
to read, "An assault is an unlawful
attempt coupled with real or apparent present ability to inflict a violent injury on the person of another."
Apparent Present Ability: The
courts, at common law, were evenly
divided as to whether a menace with
an unloaded gun was sufficient to
constitute~a criminal assault. Under
a statute making it a felony to assault another with a loaded weapon,
-even so technical a judge as Baron
Parke held that the statutory assault was committed by pointing an
unloaded gun: Reg. v. St. George
(1840) 9 C. & P. 483. Sir Frederick Pollock in his "Treatise on
Torts". (11th ed., 1920) p. 215,
thought that this rule should be followed, but as will be shown later in
this comment different fundamental
policies are involved in criminal
law. The later English cases expressly reversed Baron Parke's holding and insisted .that a present ability should exist: Reg. v. James
(1844) 1.Gar. & K. 530; Reg. v.
Baker (1844) 1 Car. & K. 254.
Mahty American courts, under the
common law or under variously
worded statutes, have held that "putting in fear" is sufficient to constitute the. offense. None of these
courts were interpreting an assault
statute worded as the Illinois Statute: People v. Tremaine (1927) 129
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Misc. Rep. 650, 222 N. Y. Supp. 432
(the New York statute expressly
declares that pointing an unloaded
firearm at another in a threatening
manner constitutes an assault, where
the party at whom it is pointed does
not know that it is- not loaded, or
has no -reason to believe that it is
not, and is, by the act of the menacing party put in fear of bodily
harm); Price v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th,
1907) 156 Fed. 950; Crumbley. v.
State (1878) 61 Ga. 582 (here the
defendant actually fired a light powder charge at the victim as a
"prank") ; State v. Atkinson (1906)
141 N. C. 734, 53 S. E. 228 (N. C.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1931) §4216, expressly makes pointing of an unloaded gun, an assault); Ford v.
State (1904) 71 Neb. 246, 98 N. W.
807;' Commonwealth v. White (1872)
110 Mass. 407; State v. Shepard
(1859) 10 Ia. 126. Contra:State v.
Jerome (1891) 82 Ia. 749, 48 N. W.
722; State v,.Lewis (1915) 173 Ia.
643, 154 N. W. 432 (changing the
Iowa rule). Mr. Justice Wells in
Commonwealth v. White, supra,
presented as reasons for adhering
to this view that it is not the secret
intent of the assaulting party, nor
the undisclosed fact of his ability or
inability to commit a battery, that
is material, but what his conduct
and the attending circumstances denote at the time to the party assaulted. If to him they indicate
an attack he is justified in resorting
to defensive action. The same rule
applies, said this judge, to the proof
necessary to sustain a criminal complaint for ini assault, for it is the
outward demonstration that constitutes the mischief which is punishable zs a breach of the peace.
As expressed by Professor C. A.
Keigwin in "Is an Intent to Do
Harm Requisite to a Criminal As-
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sault?" (1928) 17 Georgetown Law
Journal 56, the essence of the wrong
is the violation of security, the disturbance of mental composure, and
the generation of fear in the mind.
Such views have been uttered by
many leaders in Criminal Law: 2
Bishop, "Criminal Law" (9th ed.,
.1923) §32 (assault is defined as an
apparent attempt to do corporal
hurt to another); Clark & Marshall, "Crimes" (2d ed., 1905) §206.
Actual Present Ability: It seems
that theoretically, at least, an opposite view would be the correct one.
An able exponent of this idea states
that crimes are usually considered
subjectively, not objectively; the
state of mind of the accused is the
important consideration, and not the
state of mind of the person injured:
Miller, "Criminal Law" (1934) p.
305. The test should be the intent of
the accused, not the fear of injury
of the victim of the alleged assault.
Larceny is committed because the"
taker has the intent to steal, not becauae the victim thinks he is robbed;
burglary is only committed 'when
the intruder enters with intent to
commit a felony, not wheh, in the
absence of such intent, the householder is put in fear by an entry
with some other intent. Furthermore, it is a general principle of
law that there is no crime unless
intent accompanies the crime. For
an able discussion of the maxim,
"Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea" see Levitt, "The Origin of
the Doctrine of Mens Rea" (1922)
17 Ill. Law Rev. 117; Levitt, "Extent and Function of the Doc trine
of Mens Red' (1923) 17 Ill. Law
Rev. 578. Also assault is generally
considered an attempt to commit a
battery, and in attempts to commit
crimes it is universally held that an
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intent is an essential element:
ability must exist to convict for a
Dahlberg v. People, supra.
criminal assault is widely accepted
The view that intent and, as a in many American jurisdictions:
necessary corollary, present ability People v. Pape (1885) 66 Cal. 366
is not necessary proceeds on two
("apparent" ability does not mean
grounds. The first is that an act of that it must be apparent to the perthe defendants putting the victim son against whom the alleged asin fear would justify the victim in sault is made); State v. Godfrey
repelling the force with which he is
(1889) 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625;
menaced. This is true enough, but People v. Lilley (1880) 43 Mich.
not because the defendant is guilty 521, 5 N. W. 982 (the test in crimof an assault, but rather on the inal cases cannot be the mere fact
ground of mistake of fact: Stein- of unlawfully putting one in fear,
meyer v. People (1880) 95 Il 383; or in creating alarm in the mind,
People v. Welch (1888) 71 Mich. for one may obviously be assaulted
548, 39 N. W. 747. The second although in complete ignorance of
ground is the application by some the fact, and therefore entirely free
courts of the tort doctrine of as- from alarm); State v. Napper
sault in criminal cases. (See Beach (1870) 6 Nev. 113; State v. Fastv. Hancock (1853) 27 N. H. 223;
binder (1884) 42 Ohio St. 341;
Allan v. Hannaford (1926)
138 Robinson v. State (1868) 31 Tex.
Wash. 432, 244 Pac. 700.)
This 171; Chapman v. State (1885) 78
was done by Baron Parke in Reg. v. Ala. 463; Klein v. State (Ind. App.,
St. George, supra, and Mr. Justice 1894), 36 N. E. 763; State v. Sears
Wells in Commonwealth v. White, (1885) 86 Mo. 169; People v. Leong
supra. Admittedly, one who has Yune Gun (1889) 77 Cal. 636, 20
Pac. 27.. Several jurisdictions desuffered from the act of anothei
should be entitled to recover dam- mand a piesent ability but make it
ages in a civil action whetlier there a matter of defense for the defendwas any actual intent to harm or ant to prove at trial: McNamara
not. Such civil actions lie since they v. State (1897) 24 Colo. 61, 48"Pac.
rest on the invasion of a person's 541.; State v. Herron (1892) 12
right to live in society without be- Mont. 230, 29 Pac. 819.
ing put in fear of .personal harm.
Statutory Assault: The authoriBut generally the criminal law ex- ties are neither in agreement in
tends its protection against certain regard to the majority rule at comacts only to benefit the state and mon law, nor as to which rule
punishment is inflicted on the ground should be followed. However, they
of injury to the public at large. agree that no *common law rule
Therefore, an act which would con- should be authority for the statustitute a cause of action for which tory definition of the offense. This
damages might be recovered by an last view the Supreme Court of
injured individual is not necessarily Illinois has consistently refused to
such an act as the State wishes to recognize. It is distinctly noted,
prosecute for its own pr6tection. even by those courts and text
For a fine discussion of the dis- writers inclined to the view that the
tinction between crimes and torts question of assault should be detersee Miller, op. cit. supra, p. 20.
mined by the test of whether it in. The Rule that an actual present duces fear in the assailed rather
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than by the test of whether the assailant possessed an actual present
ability to commit bodily injury, that
where a statute defines assault in
the language of the statute in force
in this state, the existence of actual
present ability is indispensable to
support a conviction of the crime of
assault and apparent present ability
is not sufficient. The Circuit Court
of Appeals, 9th Circuit, in Price v.
U..S., supra, although following the
opposite view admitted that its decision would, necessarily, be different under a statute similar to the
Illinois Assault Statute. Of like
tenor is State v. Shepard, supra.
Clark & Marshall, loc. cit. supra,
cites Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford &
Moses, 1921)" §2330, as a type of
statute which alters the common
law rule and expressly requires actual ability to inflict a battery.
Bishop, "Statutory Crimes" (3rd
ed., 1901) §512, points out that present ability to inflict an injury is
indispensable" under Ind. Ann. Stat.
(Burns, 1933) §10-402. Miller, op.
cit. supra, §99, cites the Arkansas
Statute, Tex. Ann. Digest (Paschal,
1878) §2137, and Cal. Pen. Code
(Deering, 1931) §240, as examples
of those which expressly demand
an actual present ability to inflict
the injury intended. The laiiguage
of all the above statutes is similar
to §55 of the Illinois Criminal Code
which demands "present ability."
Decisions under these and identical statutes have uniformly applied
the test of actual present ability as
an essential element of a criminal
assault: Alk. Dig. Stat. (Crawford
& Moses, 1921) §2330; Parsley v.
State (1921) 148 Ark. 518, 230 S.
W. 587; Hine v. State (1919) 139
Ark. 223, 213 S. W. 381; Pratt v.
State (1887) 49 Ark. 179, 4 S. W.
785. The Supreme Court of Ar-
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kansas in Hunt v. State (1914) 114
Ark. 239, 169 S. W. 773, held that
an impotent man might be guilty
of an assault with intent to rape.
The question of a present ability to
assault was not there involved, but
rather the ability of the assailant to
complete the felony itself. It was
decided that an impotent man might
-be capable of statutory rape. The
latest. decision, Dodd v. State (Ark.,
1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 799, quotes
with approval that portion of 2 R.
C. L., §9, which states that it is not
necessary at all that the defendant's
words should be accompanied or
followed by an actual battery, but
he must either offer to do violence,
as by drawing back his fist or raising a stick; or attempting to do it,
as by aiming a blow at another
which does not take effect because
it is warded off by a third person,
or by shooting at another and missing the mark. Arizona makes lack
of present ability a matter of defense to be proved by the defendant
at trial. Ariz. Code (Struckmeyer,
1928) §4611; Richardson v. State
(1928) 34 Ariz. 139, 268 Pac. 615;
Brimhall v. State (1927) 31 Ariz.
522, 255 Pac. 165. However, present ability is still the test of criminal assault. An excellent dissent
by Mr. Justice Duffy points out the
error in the Arizona view: Territory v. Gomez (1912) 14 Ariz. 139,
125 Pac. 702. To constitute the
crime of assault there must be the
unlawful attempt to commit a violent injury upon the person of another, and with the making of such
attempt there must be co-existent
the ability to carry such attempt
ifito execution; i. e., to commit the
injury. Each is a necessary element of the crime, and both must
concur. If either one is missing,
the accusation fails. Each then is
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a necessary allegation of the indictment. Both must be alleged, states
Mr. Justice Duffy, and the existence
of each must be established by competent evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. When the weapon used is
a pistol, to presume, or infer, or
take for granted that the pistol is
loaded is to presume the existence
of one of the material allegations
of the indictment; in other words,
it presumes the guilt of the defendant, and compels him to prove his
innocence by proving the non-existence of one of the material elements
of the offense to-wit, the ability to
'inflict injury. Originally, Texas required present ability: Tex. Ann.
Digest (Paschal, 1878) §2137; McKay v. State (1875) 44 Tex. 43;
Gann v. State (Tex. Crim. App.
1897) 40 S. W. 725. But the rule
has been changed by a new assault
statute, Tex. Pen. Code (1925) Art.
1141, §3, making the test the putting
in fear of the assailed. See Oliver
v. State (1910) 60 Tex Crim. 62
In other states present ability is the
test: 4Idaho Code (1932) §17-1201;
State v. Yturaspe (1912) 22 Idaho
360, 125 Pac. 802;.State v. Bush
(1930) 50 Idaho 166, 295 Pac. 432;
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929)
§10094; State v. Napper, supra;
State v. MacKinnon (1917) 41 Nev.
182, 168 Pac. 330; Ind. Ann Stat.
(Burns, 1933) §10-402; Klein v.
State, supra; Howard v. State
(1879) 67 Ind. 401; West V. State
(1877) -59 Ind. 113 (holding that
the indictment, to be correct, must
allege present ability in the defendant); Cal. Pen. Code (Deering,
1931) §240; People v. Pape, supra;
People v. Sylva (1904) 143 Cal. 62,
76 Pac. 814. The Supreme Court
of- Illinois in the instant case as
well as in People v. Henry, supra,
through misapprehension, cited this
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California case as supporting the
very opposite conclusion from that
actually reached in that case. State
v. Napper, supra, and Fastbinderv.
State, supra, were also erroneously
cited. This error was rectified in
the official reports and the instant
case now rests on the authority of
Beach v. Hancock, supra,a tort case,
and State v. Shepard, supra, a decision which has been overruled by
the Iowa court.
Illinois View: In People v. Ryan
(1909) 239 I1. 410, 88 N. E. 170,
the supreme court held that placing
a newspaper under the chin of the
victim and attempting to extract a
diamond stud from his tie was not
an assault with intent to rob. It is
to be regretted that Mr. Justice
Stone, in the instant case, could
not distinguish the Ryan case. The
court here declares that it is sufficient to support the charge alleged
if the victim has been intimidated.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1933)
c. 38, §501, defines robbery as a
felonious taking by force or intimidation. The presence of thc
element of intimidation does, not
prove the assault in the offense
charged. The view uttered by Mr.
Justice Stone is found in the Attorney-General's Report and Opinions
(1930)
where
Attorney-General
Oscar E. Carlstrom stated, "Under
the definition contained in paragraph .501 aforesaid, if -there is a
felonious taking of property from
the person of another, the crime of
r6bbery is consummated, if not, the
crime of robbery has failed and the
perpetrator is not guilty of robbery.
On the other hand, if a person
makes an attempt to commit a robbery and has the ability to conmit
the robbery at the time of the attempt, but for some reason or another fails in the attempt, he is
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guilty of an assault with an intent
to commit robbery." Mr. Carlstrom
was clearly in error. Robbery may
be committed by intimidation but
an assault demands an element of
actual ability to inflict a violent injury. To accept Carlstrom's view
we must alter the wording of ihe
Assault Statute and also assume
that the Illinois Attempt Statute
was passed for no practical purpose.
Illinois was oie of the earli est
states to adopt a liberal construction
statute (1845).
This statute, Ill.
Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c.
131, §1, states that all general provisions, terms, phrases and expressions used in any statute shall be
liberally construed, in order that the
true intent and meaning of the legislature may be fully carried out.
The' rule of liberal construction of
penal statutes has not been widely
accepted in this state; the courts
favor a reasonable construction:
People v. Fox (1915) 269 II1. 300,
110 N. E. 26; People v. Mueller
(1933) 352 Ill. 124, 185 N. E. 239;
or they retain the common law view
of strict construction: People v. Peacock (1881) 98 Ill. 172; Albrecht
v. People (1875) 78 Ill.
510. For
an excellent discussion, see Hall,
"Strict or Liberal Construction of
Penal Statutes" (1935) 48 Harv.
Law Rev. 748. 'Irrespective of
whether it might be deemed advisable to provide that merely apparent present ability should be sufficient to constitute the crime of assault, there exists no power in the
court to ext6nd the plain words of
the statute. In C., R. I., & P. Ry.
Co. v. People (1905) 217 Ill. 164,
75 N. E. 368; the supreme court
declaed that penal statutes are, by
well settled principles of law, to be
strictly construed and matters and
things which are not dearly in-
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cluded cannot be brought within the
operation of such statutes by mere
construction.
And in People v.
Patten (1930) 338 Ili. 385, 170 N.
E. 280, the court uttered the belief
that even if the legislature accidentally or inadvertently failed to
express its intention to declare that
certain conduct shall constitute a
"crime or misdemeanor, yet it is
powerless to correct the error or
to supply the omission no matter
how plainly the conduct in question
is within the mischief intended to
be remedied by the statute.
The test of "apparent present
ability" applied by the court is not
only contrary to the statute in force
in Illinois but has also been held
to be erroneous as a test in all states
with a similar statute, and by many
jurisdictions even in the absence of
such statutes. An apparent present
ability is no present ability at all;
and such a test violates the statute.
In the instant case the defendant
had no actual present abilityto carryout any threat (it was not alleged
that- he attempted to use his fist, or
that it was capable of -inflicting a
violent injury). The intimidation
lay solely in the deception of the
complaining witness by the defendant into making him believe that
he was in possession of a gun. The
punishment, for the offense, assessed against the defendant was
measured on the idea that it would
curb the use of dangerous weapons.
It is not our province to say that
the legislature should set against all
those attempting crimes the punishment of one day in jail or a life
time in the penitentiary, but neither
is it within the power of the coturts
to alter the reasonable punishment
for offenses designated by legislature.
The Draft Code of Criminal Law
and Procedure, proposed by the
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Committee on Revision, Section of
Criminal Law and its Enforcement
of the Illinois State Bar Association in cooperation with the judicial
Advisory Council of Cook County
has revised the assault statute now
to read (§6 of House Bill No. 712
in 59th General Assembly) "An assault is an unlawful attempt coupled
with apparent present ability to
commit a violent injury on the perThe proposed
son of another."
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change in this offense is some indication that the test of apparent
present ability has been erroneously
applied under the present statute.
Until such time as the proposed
criminal code is adopted, the assault statute should be correctly interpreted to conform to the intent
of the legislature and the uniform
holdings of the other states.
PAUL FREEMAN.

